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Abstract. In the railway domain safety is guaranteed by an interlocking
system which translates operational decisions into commands leading to
field operations. Such a system is safety critical and demands thorough
formal verification during its development process. Within this context,
our work has focused on the extension of a compositional model check-
ing approach to formally verify interlocking system models for lines with
multiple stations. The idea of the approach is to decompose a model of
the interlocking system by applying cuts at the network modelling level.
The paper introduces an alternative cut (the linear cut) to a previously
proposed cut (border cut). Powered with the linear cut, the model check-
ing approach is then applied to the verification of an interlocking system
controlling a real-world multiple station line.
Keywords: Railway interlocking · Compositional verification · Model
checking
1 Introduction
A railway is a mechanised means of mass movement where diverse vehicles take
paths on a shared space/network of tracks. Its main feature is guidance by
mechanical contact of wheels on rails. Switch points are introduced to dynami-
cally change the network topology allowing a vehicle to change tracks. Another
distinctive feature is the poor braking response time given the physical proper-
ties of wheel on rail rolling friction. Such features impose hard restrictions on
traffic, vehicle movements, and network configuration.
To regulate traffic, a railway signalling system [14] is deployed as an infor-
mation processing/transmission control loop. The system monitors the status of
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vehicles and track elements issuing network re-configuration and vehicle dispatch
commands. The usually deployed monitoring scheme assumes that the network
under control is divided into sections with train detection equipment and the
existence of additional track side elements such as signals. The status (occupied
or clear) of train detection sections, position of points, and configuration of track
side elements (e.g. the setting of signals) is relayed to the control system. Issued
decisions are then transmitted back to each element affecting its configuration
(e.g.: issuing a change in point position) and vehicle movements (e.g.: sending
dispatch commands to trains through signals).
The technology/operation mode of signalling systems ranges from basic
human communication, for instance telecommunications between stakeholders
(human controllers, station masters, and vehicle operators), to advanced automa-
tion where computers are responsible for the whole control loop. Usually the
different systems are used heterogeneously through a network. Several of the
recent railway disasters were due to signalling system failures1 in networks lack-
ing automated control.
Automated systems require railway engineers/architects to define the appro-
priate operation requirements, for instance in the form of routes: each prescribing
the path and the required network configuration for safe train traversal along
that path. When the system issues a dispatch route command, the network must
be reconfigured to comply with such requirements. In addition, the system must
ensure the required configuration is maintained during the traversal. And above
all, the command must not lead to a safety violation. For that purpose an inter-
locking system takes the responsibility of safely transform each dispatch decision
into the control commands that must be executed before a proceed command to
a train is issued.
Such responsibility demands for standards in the development of the software
controlling interlocking systems. The standard CENELEC 50128 [1] labels such
software with the highest safety integrity level (SIL4), and highly recommends
the usage of formal methods and formal verification in its development process.
However, full formal verification of interlocking systems demands heavy if not
infeasible computational resources2, a phenomenon known as the state explo-
sion problem. The pioneering research in model checking and in applying model
checking to the domain of railways [3–5,7,9,20] has developed techniques allow-
ing the verification of models of the interlocking systems controlling larger and
highly-complex networks. For example, abstraction techniques can be applied at
the domain modelling level before the model checking is performed [9]. Other
very efficient techniques applied for real world railways are bounded model check-
ing [8] and k-induction [19]. The state explosion problem can also be tamed using
techniques that allow a compositional approach to the model checking task [10]:
the model checker must prove that assumptions imply the guarantees of each
1 For instance the July 2016 rural Southern-Italy head-on train collision would have
been prevented if automated train detection equipment had been in place.
2 A model of the interlocking for a fairly simple network may lead to the potential
inspection of an astronomical number of states (e.g. in the order of 1051 [11]).
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contract of the component. The authors report that this technique allowed the
verification of a real world station.
Pursuing the same goal, in a previous work [11] we described a compositional
approach to the verification of safety properties of models of interlocking systems
controlling lines with multiple stations. The approach was developed in the con-
text of the RobustRailS research project3 extending an automated method for
the formal verification of the new Danish interlocking systems [17–19]. The idea
in our previous work was based on the observation that decomposing a network
at specific points which satisfy a given topological configuration (called border
cut, see Fig. 1) generates sub-models corresponding to a complete partition of
disjoint, connected components of the state space. It is therefore straightforward
to combine the results of checking each sub-model to compute the result of check-
ing the monolithic model. This is the case as the routes that can be set inside
one sub-model are completely independent from those in the other sub-model.
b15            b14 t14 
Station A  
               t13 
Station B  
Fig. 1. Border cut dividing the network topology into two parts.
We have then realised that the border cut configuration does not occur in
some real world networks, but instead a similar configuration (that we call linear
cut, see Sect. 3.1), in which the routes of the two sub-models partially overlap,
is frequent. Inspired by the already cited compositional approach [10], where a
similar route overlap is taken into account, we have modified our compositional
approach to consider linear cut configurations as the points at which to cut
a network into sub-models. This requires a finer analysis of the interferences
between sub-models, but again we show that checking each sub-model allows
the result of checking the monolithic model to be computed, with significant
verification time savings.
The exposition of our results is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we recall some
principles of railway interlocking systems and present the RobustRailS verifica-
tion method and toolkit on the top of which we have built our compositional
approach; in Sect. 3 we present our approach using a divide-and-conquer strat-
egy: we introduce the linear cut and explain how our method first uses this to
divide a network into sub-networks, then generates sub-models and finally con-
quer the model checking results for these. The soundness and completeness of
the approach is proved in Sect. 4, and in Sect. 5 we report on the results given
3 In Denmark, in the years 2009–2021, new interlocking systems that are compati-
ble with the standardised European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 [2] will
be deployed in the entire country within the context of the Danish Signalling Pro-
gramme. In the context of the RobustRailS project accompanying the signalling
programme on a scientific level, the approach is applied to the new systems.
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by the application of our compositional approach to a typical example and to
a real-world line that nearly reached the capacity bounds of the adopted tools
when proved as a whole. In both cases the results show that significant gains
in verification effort can be achieved. Section 6 summarises the achieved results
and discusses possible future extensions and improvements of the work presented
here, especially in the direction of addressing interlocking systems that control
large stations.
2 The New Danish Route-Based Interlocking Systems
In this section we introduce briefly the new Danish interlocking systems and the
domain terminology. The subsequent Sect. 2.1 explains different components of a
specification of an interlocking system which is compatible with ERTMS/ETCS
Level 2 [2], and Sect. 2.2 explains how the safety properties are verified.
2.1 Specification of Interlocking Systems
The specification of a given route-based interlocking system I = (N,R) consists
of two components: (N) a railway network, and (R) an interlocking table.
Railway Networks. A railway network in ETCS Level 2 consists of a number
of track and track-side elements of different types4: linear sections, points, and
marker boards. Figure 2 shows an example layout of a railway network having
six linear sections (b10,t10,t12,t14,t20,b14), two points (t11,t13), and eight
marker boards (mb10, . . . , mb21). These terms, and their functionality within
the railway network, will be explained in more detail in the next paragraphs.
Fig. 2. An example railway network layout.
A linear section is a section with up to two neighbours: one in the up end,
and one in the down end. For example, the linear section t12 in Fig. 2 has t13
and t11 as neighbours at its up end and down end, respectively. In Danish
railway’s terminology, up and down denote the directions in which the distance
from a reference location is increasing and decreasing, respectively. The reference
location is the same for both up and down, e.g., an end of a line. For simplicity,
in the examples and figures in the rest of this article, the up (down) direction is
assumed to be the left-to-right (right-to-left) direction.
4 Here we only show types that are relevant for the work presented in this article.
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A point can have up to three neighbours: one at the stem, one at the plus
end, and one at the minus end, e.g., point t11 in Fig. 2 has t10, t12, and t20
as neighbours at its stem, plus, and minus ends, respectively. The ends of a
point are named so that the stem and plus ends form the straight (main) path,
and the stem and minus ends form the branching (siding) path. A point can
be switched between two positions: PLUS and MINUS. When a point is in the
PLUS (MINUS) position, its stem end is connected to its plus (minus) end, thus
traffic can run from its stem end to its plus (minus) end and vice versa. It is not
possible for traffic to run from plus end to minus end and vice versa.
Linear sections and points are collectively called (train detection) sections,
as they are provided with train detection equipment used by the interlocking
system to detect the presence of trains. Note that sections are bidirectional, i.e.,
trains are allowed to travel in both directions (but not at the same time).
Along each linear section, up to two marker boards (one for each direction)
can be installed. A marker board can only be seen in one direction and is used
as reference location (for the start and end of routes) for trains going in that
direction. For example, in Fig. 2, marker board mb13 is installed along section
t12 for travel direction up. Contrary to legacy systems, there are no physical sig-
nals in ETCS Level 2, but interlocking systems have a virtual signal associated
with each marker board. Virtual signals play a similar role as physical signals in
legacy systems: a virtual signal can be OPEN or CLOSED, respectively, allowing
or disallowing traffic to pass the associated marker board. However, trains (more
precisely train drivers) do not see the virtual signals, as opposed to physical
signals. Instead, the aspect of virtual signals (OPEN or CLOSED) is communi-
cated to the onboard computer in the train via a radio network. For simplicity,
the terms virtual signals, signals, and marker boards are used interchangeably
throughout this paper.
Interlocking Tables. An interlocking system constantly monitors the status of
track-side elements, and sets them to appropriate states in order to allow trains
travelling safely through the railway network under control. The new Danish
interlocking systems are route-based. A route is a path from a source signal to a
destination signal in the given railway network. A route is called an elementary
route if there are no signals that are located between its source signal and its
destination signal, and that are intended for the same direction as the route.
In railway signalling terminology, setting a route denotes the process of allo-
cating the resources – i.e., sections, points, and signals – for the route, and then
locking it exclusively for only one train when the resources are allocated.
An interlocking table specifies the elementary routes in the given railway
network and the conditions for setting these routes. The specification of a route
r and conditions for setting r include the following information, that will be
needed while verifying the expected properties:
– src(r) – the source signal of r,
– dst(r) – the destination signal of r,
– path(r) – the list of sections constituting r’s path from src(r) to dst(r),
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– overlap(r) – a list of the sections in r’s overlap5, i.e., the buffer space after
dst(r) that would be used in case trains overshoot the route’s path,
– points(r) – a map from points6 used by r to their required positions,
– signals(r) – a set of protecting signals used for flank or front protection [14]
for the route, and
– conflicts(r) – a set of conflicting routes which must not be set while r is set.
Table 1 shows an excerpt of an interlocking table for the network shown in
Fig. 2. Each row of the table corresponds to a route specification. The column
names indicate the information of the route specifications that these columns
contain. As can be seen, one of the routes has id 1a, goes from mb10 to mb13
via three sections t10, t11 and t12 on its path, and has no overlap. It requires
point t11 (on its path) to be in PLUS position, and point t13 (outside its path)
to be in MINUS position (as a protecting point). The route has mb11, mb12 and
mb20 as protecting signals, and it is in conflict with routes 1b, 2a, 2b, 3, 4, 5a,
5b, 6b, and 7.
Table 1. Excerpt of the interlocking table for the network of Fig. 2. The overlap column
is omitted as it is empty for all routes. (p = PLUS, m = MINUS)
Id src dst path points signals conflicts
1a mb10 mb13 t10;t11;t12 t11:p;t13:m mb11;mb12;mb20 1b;2a;2b;3;4;5a;5b;6b;7
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 mb20 mb11 t11;t10 t11:m mb10;mb12 1a;1b;2a;2b;3;5b;6a
2.2 The RobustRailS Verification Method and Toolkit
This section describes shortly the RobustRailS verification method and toolkit
that we use as verification technology. For detailed information, see [6,16–19].
The method for modelling and verifying railway interlocking systems is a
combination of formal methods and a domain-specific language (DSL) to express
network diagrams and interlocking tables. According to this, a toolkit consisting
of the following components is provided.
– An editor and static checker [6] for editing and checking that a DSL speci-
fication I = (N,R) (describing an interlocking system) follows certain well-
formedness rules.
5 An overlap section is needed when, for the short distance of a marker board to the
end of the section, there is the concrete danger that a braking train stops after the
end of the section, e.g. in adverse atmospheric conditions.
6 These points include points in the path and overlap, and points used for flank and
front protection. Sometimes it is required to protect tracks occupied by a train from
another train not succeeding to brake in due space. For details about flank and front
protection, see [14].
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– The bounded model checker of RT-Tester [12,15] which we use for performing
k-induction proofs as explained in [19].
– Generators transforming a DSL specification I = (N,R) of an interlocking
model into inputs to the model checker:
• a behavioural model mI (a Kripke structure) of the interlocking system
and its environment, defining the state space and possible state transi-
tions, and
• the required safety properties given as a state invariant (expressing that
there are no hazards like train collisions). The invariant is a conjunction
of high-level safety properties H over the variables of the interlocking
system model. An H-property is satisfied by an interlocking specification
I, written as H(I), if it is valid in the model of the interlocking system mI .
H(I) is valid in the model mI can be written as mI |= ∀e : EN · PH(e),
where EN is either the subset of all linear sections or all point sections in
N and PH(e) is a section property related to H.
For details of the models and properties, see [19].
The tools can be used to verify the design of an interlocking system in the
following steps:
1. A DSL specification of the configuration data (a network layout and its cor-
responding interlocking table) is constructed in the following order:
(a) first the network layout,
(b) and then the interlocking table (this is either done manually or generated
automatically from the network layout).
2. The static checker verifies whether the configuration data is statically well-
formed according to the static semantics [18] of the DSL.
3. The generators instantiate a generic behavioural model and generic safety
properties with the well-formed configuration data to generate the model
input of the model checker and the safety properties.
4. The generated model instance is then checked against the generated proper-
ties by the bounded model checker performing a k-induction proof.
The static checking in step (2) is intended to catch errors in the network layout
and interlocking table, while the model checking in step (4) is intended to catch
safety violations in the control algorithm of the instantiated model.
The tool-chain associated with the method has been implemented using the
RT-tester framework [12,15]. The bounded model checker in RT-tester uses the
SONOLAR SMT solver [13] to compute counterexamples showing the violations
of the base case or induction step. Using this SMT solver rather than a SAT
solver allowed us to use very efficient bit-vector operations.
As proof technique in step 4, we used k-induction as this was the most promis-
ing (cf. the comparison with other techniques in [19]), however, our compositional
method could also be used in combination with other proof techniques.
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3 Method
We now proceed to describe the details of how we use the locality features of
railway networks to verify large interlocking systems in a compositional manner.
The idea is to decompose the model into smaller models that are separately veri-
fied for safety properties, and to show that under given conditions such separate
verifications are enough to guarantee that the whole network satisfies the safety
properties as well. We show that a multi-station interlocking system satisfies
such conditions if a suitable (and natural) divide strategy is applied. The strat-
egy provides a completely automated method to verify this class of interlocking
systems.
3.1 Linear Cuts on Multiple Station Lines
The typical pattern of a railway is a line connecting multiple stations. Without
loss of generality, we can consider a line, denoted A  B, corresponding to a
network diagram consisting of two stations denoted by A and B, interconnected
by one or several linear sections. More complex multi-station layouts can be
obtained by concatenation of such elementary lines.
To divide multiple station lines we search for an interface I, which we define
as a linear section7 with an up and down marker board subject to certain condi-
tions described further below. A cut is then applied producing two sub-networks:
– The A network defined as the A station and the interface I. An entry marker
board is added on the up (B) side of this network.
– The B network defined as the B station and the interface I. An entry marker
board is added on the down (A) side of this network.
With the required configuration of marker boards on the interface and the addi-
tion of entry marker boards, the two sub-networks fulfil the required marker
board configuration at borders of a railway network.
T3            T2  
A station
               P2 
B station  
Fig. 3. The multiple station line pattern where sections T2 and T3 connect two stations
A and B.
T2                 P2 
Fig. 4. Resulting A network.
T3            T2 
Fig. 5. Resulting B network.
7 The extension of the interface to divide networks with parallel tracks is straightfor-
ward and defines the interface as a set I of linear sections dividing a network into
disjoint and valid connected sub-networks.
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For example in Fig. 3 we depict a highlight of a line network diagram in
which T2 connects two stations A and B. In the example A contains element
P2 and its down neighbours and B contains elements T3 and its up neighbours.
Linear section T2 configures a candidate to a linear cut, which results in the
two networks illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, where the linear section (T2) is kept
in both as it defines the interface I.
To guarantee that the compositional approach (to be described in next sub-
section) is sound, the interface I must satisfy the following linear cut conditions
(LCCs):
1. there is an up marker board on the upper part of the interface section I and
a down marker board on the down part;
2. the two networks (A and B) resulting from the cut described above must only
have I in common;
3. no flank/front protection requirements for routes in the up (down) sub-
network B (A) depends on elements outside B (A), except for routes in down
(up) direction with destination marker board mounted in I (i.e. routes that
end at the entrance of the A (B) station).
3.2 A Compositional Model Checking Approach
In the division process a network is inspected in search for regions that present
candidate patterns to be cut, that is, linear sections of the form T2 of Fig. 3. The
search is then recursively applied to the created sub-networks, until either no
more suitable cut points can be found or the sub-networks produced are already
sufficiently small.
The linear cut allows to automate the compositional verification of multi-
station interlocking systems by dividing the network in sub-networks by means
of four steps:
1. Search the network for suitable interfaces satisfying the LCCs. For each inter-
face instantiate the A  B pattern and divide recursively the network into
sub-networks as described in Subsect. 3.1.
2. For each of the resulting sub-networks Ni, complete the specification of a
sub-interlocking system using the interlocking table generator mentioned in
item 1 of Sect. 2.2. The resulting specifications are called the Ni interlocking
specifications.
3. Statically check each of the resulting Ni specifications and generate the mod-
els mNi (called the Ni models) and properties to be verified using the checker
and generator mentioned in item 2 and item 3, respectively, of Sect. 2.2.
4. Verify the mNi models following item 4 of Sect. 2.2.
4 Soundness and Completeness of the Approach
To prove that the decomposition approach is sound and complete one needs
to show that the result of checking any of the high-level safety properties H
Compositional Model Checking of Interlocking Systems for Lines 155
(as defined in Subsect. 2.2) for the A and B sub-models implies the result of
checking the same property H for the A  B monolithic model, and vice versa.
(The extension to more than one sub-model is then straightforward). First we
prove soundness and then completeness.
4.1 Soundness
Soundness can be rephrased in terms of H’s related invariant PH. If the invariant
holds for every section in the A interlocking specification and for every section
in the B interlocking specification we can conclude the whole interlocking spec-
ification A  B satisfies H, meaning its related invariant PH holds for every
section in the A  B interlocking specification.
Given that H-properties are universal quantifications over the sets of lin-
ear/point sections8, a natural strategy to produce such a proof is to decom-
pose the property in terms of the disjoint sets of sections defining the A and
B stations, and the interface I. That is, the H related property PH holds for
every section in the A  B network, if PH holds for every section of the net-
work containing the A station, for the interface section I, and for every section
of the network containing the B station. In mathematical terms, if we denote
by EA the set of sections of an interlocking specification A, it corresponds to
rewrite the formulation of the satisfiability of H by the model of A  B, i.e.
mAB |= ∀e : EAB · PH(e), into:
mAB |= (∀e : A · PH(e)) ∧ PH(I) ∧ (∀e : B · PH(e)) (1)
The aforementioned rewrite leads one to decompose the proof into three lemmas.
The first two relate the local properties satisfied by A  B and A and similarly
by A  B and B.
Lemma 1. Consider a line interlocking specification with A and B stations sat-
isfying the A  B pattern, the A and B interlocking specifications resulting
from the application of a linear cut, a high-level safety property H and its related
invariant PH. We relate the outcome of evaluating H(A) and H(A  B) through
the following implication:
mAB |= ∀e : A · PH(e) ⇐ mA |= ∀e : A · PH(e)
Proof. By contradiction. Let us assume that in mA the property PH holds for
every section in A and there is a section e in A such that PH(e) does not hold in
the mAB model. Then, as detailed in [19], there is a state s of mAB, where
PH(e) is false, reachable from the initial state by a sequence of transitions (trace)
that we denote as t∗. The state s is characterised by an assignment of values
to a vector of variables referring to the elements (sections, signals etc.) of the
network. Due to the linear cut definition, such variables refer to elements that
8 In the following, for simplicity, we just quantify over the whole set of sections of a
network, intending that we are referring either only to point or only to linear sections
according to the nature of H.
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are in the A or in the B network. Any transition in t∗ changes such assignments:
following t∗ we can find in mA a corresponding trace t∗′ that makes the same
changes to the variables in the state vector of mA, skipping those transitions in
t∗ that do not change variables in mA. The trace t∗′ therefore ends in a reachable
state s′ in which the assignments to variables in mA are the same of those of s,
and hence PH(e) does not hold, contradicting the hypothesis.
Lemma 2. The dual case of Lemma 1. Given by substitution of the interlocking
specification A by B, H(A) by H(B) and A by B.
The two lemmas above allow us to transfer checking results on the sections of
the two stations A and B to the check of the whole line; however, we still miss
the contribution of the interface section, which is copied in both the A and B
networks. The next lemma has this purpose.
Lemma 3. (Interfacing lemma) Consider the A  B interlocking specification,
the A interlocking specification and the B interlocking specification resulting from
applying a linear cut, a high-level safety property H and its related invariant PH.
For the interface I ∈ EA ∩ EB we have:
mAB |= PH(I) ⇐ mA |= PH(I) ∧ mB |= PH(I)
Proof. By contradiction. Assume PH(I) is true in both the mA and mB models,
but false in the mAB model. Furthermore assume s is the state of mAB
falsifying PH(I). Thus, there is a trace t∗ in mAB leading from the model’s
initial state to the variable assignment in s. Similarly to what said for Lemma
1 it is then possible to form a trace t∗′ in mA and a trace t∗′′ in mB from the
initial states to two states s′ and s′′ such that the state vector has an assignment
falsifying PH(I) in s′ or s′′. Thus arriving at a contradiction.
Given the proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, one is in the position to relate the
result of the monolithic checking of the A  B interlocking specification with
the results of the compositional approach in which the A and B interlocking
specifications are checked.
Theorem 1. (Soundness) Consider the A  B interlocking specification, the
A and B interlocking specifications resulting from the application of a linear cut,
and a high-level safety property H. Then
H(A  B) ⇐ H(A) ∧ H(B)
which means that if H is satisfied by A and by B, one can conclude that it is
satisfied by A  B.
Proof. Assume H(A) ∧ H(B) is true, our goal is to prove H(A  B), i.e. (cf.
Formula (1)): mAB |= (∀e : A · PH(e)) ∧ PH(I) ∧ (∀e : B · PH(e)) which is
equivalent to:
mAB |= (∀e : A · PH(e)) ∧ mAB |= PH(I) ∧ mAB |= (∀e : B · PH(e))
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Applying Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3, one obtains:
mA |= (∀e : A · PH(e)) ∧ mA |= PH(I) ∧ mB |= PH(I) ∧ mB |= (∀e : B · PH(e))
which is equivalent to: H(A) ∧ H(B).
4.2 Completeness
The following theorem states that the method is complete.
Theorem 2. (Completeness) Consider the A  B interlocking specification,
the A and B interlocking specifications resulting from the application of a linear
cut at an interface I, and a high-level safety property H. Assume that for each
internal section b of A  B which appears as a border section in one of the
subnetworks A/B (i.e. b is an B/A neighbour to I), there exists a finite trace
prefix in mAB leading a train to b from some outer border of the B/A network
without changing any of the variables that only exist in mA/mB. Then
H(A  B) ⇒ H(A) ∧ H(B)
which means that if H is dissatisfied by A or by B, one can conclude that it is
dissatisfied by A  B.
Proof. Assume that H is dissatisfied by A/B, and let t be the associated counter
example (trace). t can now be lifted to a counter example tAB in mAB by
first extending the states of t with the additional variables of mAB mapped
to their initial states, and then, if the t trace involves a train entering I from
the border b at the B/A side of I, this extended trace should be preceded by a
trace prefix from mAB leading the train to b from some outer border of B/A
without changing any of the variables that only exist in mA/mB.
5 Experiments
In this section we present the results of applying our decomposition approach
to an invented line (A  B) with two stations and to a real world case study
with eight stations. Both lines exhibit the pattern of a line with multiple stations
which cannot be divided using the border cut defined in our previous work [11].
5.1 Experimental Approach
For each of the case studies, we put the method described in Sect. 3.2 in practice
by first obtaining sub-networks (in XML format) according to the divide strategy.
Then for each sub-network, we use the RobustRailS verification tool [17–19] to
generate a model instance and safety properties, and then to verify that the
generated safety properties hold in the model.
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We also use the RobustRailS verification tool to monolithically verify the
railway network (without decomposing it) such that we can compare verifica-
tion metrics for the compositional approach with verification metrics for the
monolithic approach.
While verifying each instance we measure (in seconds) the real time taken
to obtain the verification result and what was the total memory (in MB) used
by the verification tool. In addition we collect some statistics about the network
and model instances as presented in Tables 2 and 3. Such statistics provide a
basis for complexity comparison and include: the number of linear and point
sections, the number of marker boards (signals), routes, and the potential state
space dimension (in logarithmic scale).
All the experiments for both case studies have been performed on a machine
with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-1650 @ 3.6GHz, 125GB RAM, and running
Linux 4.4.0–47.x86 64 kernel.
5.2 Two Stations Case Study
Let us consider as an example the railway line of Fig. 6 denoted A  B. In it
we find two stations: the set of elements A = {T1, P1, A1, A2, P2} defines the
A station, whereas the set B = {T3, P3, B1, B2, P4, T4} defines the B station.
The linear section T2 connects A and B.
. . .
T1d
T1u
A2d
A1d
A2u
A1u
T2d
T1b T1 A1
A2
2P1P T2
T2u
B2d
B1d
B2u
B1u
T4d
T4u
. . .
T3 P3 B1
B2
P4 T4 T4b
Fig. 6. A  B Network
The RobustRailS tool allows the automatic generation of interlocking tables
from a given network layout, and for the A  B network it generates 24 routes.
A thorough inspection of the table shows that routes can be categorised into
three blocks, partitioning the network into two disjoint networks and a common
interface (linear section T2). The inspection of the A  B route table reveals
that it makes sense to divide the A  B network into two networks, choosing
the linear section T2 as an interface between a network containing the A station
and a network containing the B station.
As planned, we have verified the model both compositionally and mono-
lithically; Table 2 shows the verification metrics, first separately for the A and
B networks. The metrics for the compositional analysis (A + B) are obtained
by summing the corresponding metrics for the networks, except for the state
space and the memory usage, which are calculated as the respective maximum
between the two sub-networks. The table also shows the verification metrics for
the monolithic analysis of the network (A  B).
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Table 2. Verification metrics for the A  B case study.
Linears Points Signals Routes log10(|S|) Time Memory
A 6 2 9 13 38 10 186
B 7 2 9 13 41 16 234
A + B 13 4 18 26 41 26 234
A  B 10 4 14 24 68 68 556
In all cases the verification tool succeeded to verify the safety properties. As
it can be observed the verification time and memory usage of the compositional
analysis (A + B) is, as expected, much better than for the monolithic analysis
of (A  B): The verification time is approximately three times faster and the
memory usage (234 MB) is more than halved.
Moreover, if the verification for the A and B networks were run in parallel, our
compositional approach would achieve a running time of just 16 s. Even though
memory consumption would increase in this case, the parallelisation would still
use less memory resources (the sum of individual memory usages: 420 MB) than
the monolithic case (556 MB).
5.3 EDL: The Real World Case Study
The EDL is the first regional line in Denmark to be commissioned in the Danish
Signalling Programme. The line spreads over 55 km from the station in Roskilde
to Næstved’s station, with 8 small to medium sized stations, and the statistics
shown in Table 3 gives insight into its composition.
With the definition of the linear cut it is now directly possible to cut the EDL
network into eight sub-networks, each corresponding to an EDL station. Six of
the sub-networks (Gadstrup, Havdrup, Herfølge, Tureby, Haslev, and Holme-
Olstrup) are of fairly similar complexity, while two (L. Skensved and Køge)
are more complex. With such a division we decompose the verification of the
interlocking system for EDL into the separate verification of the eight stations.
As in the A  B case study, the verification tool succeeded to verify the
safety properties for the eight sub-interlocking systems and the verification met-
rics show that for the compositional analysis (see the entry Compositional in
Table 3) the verification time is approximately a third (approx. 1.5 h) of that
for the monolithic analysis (approx. 4 h). Furthermore, the compositional analy-
sis uses less than half of the memory resources (9243MB) because we only need
as much as the maximum value of memory used to verify each sub-interlocking.
Although we are still far from the memory bounds of the used machine in this
experiment, such memory reduction is important when checking real world inter-
locking systems where a single station with a complex network may quickly
exhaust the amount of memory available. As already discussed, if run in parallel
our compositional approach would achieve a much better running time. Even
though memory consumption would increase, the parallelisation would only use
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Table 3. Verification metrics for the EDL case study.
Linears Points Signals Routes log10(|S|) Time Memory
Gadstrup 14 3 16 21 73 62 567
Havdrup 10 2 12 14 51 19 264
L. Skensved 15 3 16 21 75 72 616
Køge 58 23 62 75 337 5170 9243
Herfølge 6 2 10 14 39 13 210
Tureby 6 2 10 14 39 11 203
Haslev 10 2 12 14 51 14 256
Holme-Ol 12 2 16 20 63 22 352
Compositional 131 39 154 193 337 5383 9243
EDL 110 39 126 179 651 14352 22476
roughly 50% (the sum of the individual memory usages: 11711MB) of the mem-
ory resources than the monolithic case. The parallel verification time is domi-
nated by the time to verify the Køge station, which is the largest of the network:
actually, the internal layouts of the stations do not present candidates for linear
cuts, so they are not further decomposed in this approach.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a compositional approach to the problem of model checking
large railway interlocking systems. This approach, built on top of tools provid-
ing support for efficient verification of this kind of systems, is tailored to the
characteristics of multi-station interlocking systems, that is, systems that con-
trol a line connecting several stations. The approach extends our previous work
[11], by a new, realistic division process which can be applied in cases where
the previous, simpler approach is not applicable. The approach has successfully
been applied to a real world line with eight stations in which case it achieved
significant improvements in verification time and memory usage compared to
the previous non compositional verification process.
In order to compositionally address more general network layouts the linear
cut concept put forward in this paper needs to be generalised. An immediate
extension is to combine it with the border cut concept introduced in our previous
work [11]: such interesting strategy should not demand any special efforts beyond
the practicalities involved. But the generalisation of the concepts to the appli-
cation to interlocking systems controlling large stations, which exhibit highly
complex and densely connected networks, requires a novel cut concept, which
is the subject of some of our new, ongoing work. In that case the main source
of difficulty stems from the fact that a division of a large station into smaller
areas implies that some routes have to go through the operated cuts, a situation
that is not exhibited by the multiple station lines we have addressed till now.
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Actually, we have seen that the interface elements in the linear cut have the
destination signals of routes coming from both sides of the interface: in the cut
the added markerboard behaves as an abstraction of the removed subnetwork.
We are currently studying a similar abstraction principle to support the more
complex cut configuration required to address large station interlocking systems.
Another topic for future work could be to formalise the proofs done in Sect. 4
by using a proof assistant like Coq or Isabelle.
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